

Centreville Baptist Church Centreville, Virginia Haiti Security Assessment Report

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Report Prepared by:
Brannon Sims, Director of Security
Brannon.sims@cbcva.org

Centreville Baptist Church Security Ministry 15100 Lee Highway Centreville, Va 20120

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Executive Summary

The following security assessment for Haiti was conducted by the Director of Security for Centreville Baptist Church. The purpose of the assessment was to evaluate the security environment in Haiti, the logistical support provided to the traveling team, and the logistical support necessary for a future team to travel to Haiti.

It is vital to understand the need for security awareness, security preparation, and security practice when traveling overseas. The liability of each individual going overseas on behalf of an organization rests with that said organization.

Prior to this trip the CBC Security Ministry has placed the following security practices into action: current open source travel intelligence brief to all members of the traveling team, a team roster with vitals on team members given to the Dir. Of Administration, and a team roster of vitals given to the Team Lead while on the trip.

There are three major security issues that were discovered that could have significant impact on the operations of CBC while in Haiti. The three issues will be addressed in the following document, but are: lack of emergency evacuation policies/procedures from any organization involved, lack of crisis management policies/procedures from any organization involved, and lack of a professional/trained security element for the traveling team.

Top-Ten List

The list below contains the "top ten" findings, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities discovered during the security assessment. Some of the issues listed here are coalesced from more than one section of the assessment report findings. Additional information about each is provided elsewhere in the report.

It is recommended that these be evaluated and addressed as soon as possible. These should be considered significant and may impact the operations of the Centreville Baptist Church Haiti mission effort

1. Emergency Evacuation Policy

An emergency evacuation policy is the primary guide for the processes to conduct a full emergency evacuation from a specific location. There is no formal policy specific to Centreville Baptist Church (CBC), Southern Baptist Conservatives of Virginia (SBCV), or the Florida Baptist Convention (FBC).

Recommendation: Develop an emergency evacuation policy that specifically addresses the needs of each individual organization (CBC, SBCV, FBC) and their missions.

2. Crisis Management Policy

A crisis management policy is the primary guide for the processes to handle an emergency situation in a specific location. This policy works jointly with an emergency evacuation policy based on the situation and the circumstances. There is no formal policy specific to CBC, SBCV, or the FBC.

Recommendation: Develop a crisis management policy that specifically addresses the needs of each individual organization (CBC, SBCV, FBC) and their missions.



3. Traveling Security Element

A traveling security element is a trained unit of individuals or trained security representative whose whole responsibility is to provide a security layer between the public and the team. This element is to be the eyes and ears of the team and engaged in the local environment for the protection of the team.

Recommendation: Develop/Hire/Train a security element to handle the security presence for individuals/teams working in Haiti. Each organization has their own unique mission, and will need to apply this recommendation based on their specific circumstances.

4. Emergency Communications Equipment

Emergency communications equipment is vital to have when traveling out of country. It is imperative to be able to reach local emergency personnel, and to have the capability to reach back to the parent organization of the team members in case of an emergency.

Recommendation: CBC should acquire and assign a church designated piece of equipment for each overseas trip.

5. Ground Transportation

Ground transportation is a necessary mode of transportation and the only method in this environment. The transportation selected should provide a safe and secure environment for all passengers. It should help to protect individuals from the weather elements, criminal acts, and being a "soft target" in the local environment. In foreign countries, disaster areas, and extreme risk environments you will see US Embassy Staff, large humanitarian organizations, and others using enclosed vehicles.

Recommendation: FBC needs to switch from tap-taps as the mode of transportation to enclosed vehicles. CBC should not send another team to Haiti until a secure, safe, and enclosed vehicle can be provided to the whole team for the duration of the trip.

6. Route Security

When providing a transportation capability to a team of visitors it is imperative to know the area. All routes prior to travel need to be preplanned with all drivers and any security present. Routes should consist of 2-3 different paths to and from the original destination, emergency care, safe houses, evac points, and the US Embassy. The routes need to be based on the safest aspect as possible, not focused on the quickest. As it is often seen that the quickest route can and does lead into the most congested areas, and during an emergency that can cause the team to become more vulnerable or under direct assault. It is also important that drivers be aware of their surroundings and what's going on in the community they will be in for that trip.

Recommendation: FBC should train their drivers in defensive driving, evac operations, route planning, route security, and travel planning. CBC should contact the host organization in the "planning stage" to verify the drivers have and will be prepared to transport the team the safest route possible, even if it is not the quickest.

7. Housing Security/Operations

If an organization or personnel are providing housing to foreigners in their home country security is a vital component of the trip. The local and parent organization of the housing agreement are



responsible for their guests and their safety while using their facilities. There are a lot of things the host organization can do to provide a safe environment for their guests. It is recommended that they consult with a professional and do online research to see their current options. The list of options will not be listed here as it would be too long, and require lots of explaining.

Recommendation: Please read further in the document about the recommendations for this Haiti Security Assessment, as the list is extensive.

8. Tactical Medical Bag

When traveling overseas based on the location it is vital for the team to be prepared to handle any immediate emergency themselves while trying to get to a professional center. Most places you go or partner with in country do not have the capability to provide immediate care. So as you travel plan, prepare, and carry your own equipment that is necessary based on your destination.

Recommendation: CBC should continue to us the tactical medical bag for the overseas trips they participate in. Specifically for Haiti it is recommended to double the contents of the bag due to the extreme/harsh environment in Haiti.

9. Selection of Team Members

When going on a trip it is important to consider the environment where you are going when allowing, selecting, or offering trip opportunities to people. We currently live in a world that is growing more and more unsafe for Americans abroad, and we are also going to areas that are more dangerous than in the past. It is imperative for the trip leaders to assess the destination for threats, criminal acts, weather, age restrictions, and liability.

Recommendation: During the rebuilding phase of Haiti, CBC should only send men, and men who are physically capable to handle the harsh environment/conditions. All individuals on the trip should be 21 years of age and older, if they are in college then they need to be mature adults. This is due to the security atmosphere, danger, sanitation, and responsibilities of all parties involved.

10. Transition from Rebuilding to Missions Teaching

The transition from the Rebuilding phase to the direct Missions Teaching phase will be a unique operation. There are a lot of unknowns at the time of this security assessment. As a mission based organization it is imperative to pre plan the operation, and not commit too quickly without doing due diligence in looking into the future of Haiti.

Recommendation: Please read further in this document about this topic as it will be addressed in length below.

Introduction

The following detailed security assessment report is designed to provide a current situational awareness of the environment in which CBC, SBCV, and FBC operate in Haiti. It is meant to provide not only the details of the current environment, but help prepare the next action steps necessary for each organization so they can continue to have a safe, and secure operation in Haiti.

Note: Due to a private meeting with the In-Country Director and an FBC Director, details have been added to the report that pertains to their specific mission and operations. This has been done per their request.

Assessment Scope

Project Scope

In Scope

The following activities are within the scope of this project:

- Interviews with key staff members in charge of policy, administration, day-to-day operations, and facilities management.
- End of trip interview with Team as a whole based on their observations, questions, and/or concerns.
- A visual walk through of the facilities with administrative and facilities personnel to assess physical security.
- An ongoing assessment of travels to include: air, land, and by foot.
- A site assessment based on the pre-arranged arrangements of the host organization to where workers will be engaged with the local population.

Out of Scope

The following activities are NOT part of this security assessment:

- Penetration Testing of buildings, or facilities.
- Testing Disaster Recovery Plans, Business Continuity Plans, or Emergency Response Plans.

Activities Schedule

The security assessment was conducted from 02 Dec 2011 through 10 Dec 2011. All activities, travel, route, housing, work location, and personnel were evaluated. This section will not be outlined in a day by day outline, with the understanding that specific details of the trip will be addressed later within the document.

Threat Assessment

The following threat assessment was conducted while in country, through on site observations and interviews. The items reviewed are: air travel, customs, security, escorts, vehicles, translators, routes, housing, food, site work, open source information, locale situations/demeanors, emergency care, emergency personnel, and pre security planning. The risk level will be color coded as follows:



HIGH RISK

MODERATE RISK

LOW RISK

Extreme Risk – closed countries, combat zones, current attacks/riots/demonstrations, civil unrest High Risk – open countries, disaster locations, unstable, attacks/riots/demonstrations/civil unrest Moderate Risk – open countries, petty crimes against Americans, in country surveillance Low Risk – open country, American ally, little crime involvement, no sign of civil unrest

Threats to Haiti

The following lists document some of the known threats to Haiti. It should not be considered a complete and detailed list but should be used to as a basis for further thought and discussion to identify threats.

Current Haiti Risk Level

HIGH RISK

- Lack of controlled security presence (Police and/or Military)
- Lack of host organization operational security capability
- Lack of infrastructure
- Lack of sanitation
- Lack of emergency care capabilities

Natural Threats

- Earthquake
- Flooding

Intentional Threats

- Kidnappings
- Highjackings
- Theft
- Robbery
- Assault



• Civil Unrest/Rioting

Unintentional Threats

Diseases

Vulnerabilities

Listed below are the vulnerabilities discovered during the assessment. These are considered significant and steps should be taken to address them.

All three organizations (CBC, SBCV, and FBC) have no emergency evacuation policy.

Explanation

The three organizations have no emergency evacuation policy that is specific to their needs and missions objective for Haiti.

Risk

There are several risks in not having an emergency evacuation policy.

- In case of evacuation, representatives will be stranded in country and left to fend for themselves. The organization will have no set plan in place to evacuate their representatives.
- With no policy in action the representatives will be at the mercy of the U.S. State Department which will have very limited resources at its capacity.
- All representatives will not have adequate security protection, and their lives could be in danger due to civil unrest, attacks against Americans, or by natural causes.
- Without a policy, the responsible organization will be held legally liable for their representatives in country.
- Without a policy, all security measures are merely ad hoc in nature and may be misguided.

Recommendations

- Create a policy that is in compliance with the specific organizations mission objectives and is strictly focused on security.
- Periodically review and update the policy.

All three organizations (CBC, SBCV, and FBC) have no crisis management policy.

Explanation

The three organizations have no crisis management policy that is specific to their needs and missions objective for Haiti.

Risk

There are several risks in not having a crisis management policy.



- With no policy, when an incident occurs the organization will lose time that is crucial in providing support and strategic response to their representatives in danger.
- The organization will not be prepared to handle incoming questions and media attention that will express professionalism and prior preparation on the organizations behalf.
- The organization will be held legally liable for their representatives due to the organizations sending them into a risk prone country.

Recommendations

- Create a policy that is in compliance with the specific organizations mission objectives and is strictly focused on security.
- Periodically review and update the policy.

Traveling Security Element

Explanation

CBC does not have a traveling security element in place, and the host organization does not provide a trained security team.

In Country Observations

- The host organization advertised "security" for incoming teams. Yet 99% of the "security" team had no actual training in security.
- The security individuals are not armed, nor have the capability to protect a team of individuals.
- The security individuals were not aware of their surroundings 75% of the time. They would often be listening to their radios, talking on the phone, or playing games on their phone.
- The security individuals were not focused on the environment and surroundings to be looking for threats, or changes in the demeanor of the local population.
- The security individuals did not warn the team or the Director of Security of a dangerous neighborhood the team was walking in. Nothing changed in leaving the area until the Director of Security noticed the environment change and requested everyone to leave. Upon return the security individuals did not take the situation seriously and then admitted it was not a safe area to walk in. They had been instructed by the host organization prior to not go into that area with teams.
- Incoming teams need to be prepared to handle themselves and take care of the team alone, as the security provided is not enough to adequately protect a team.

Risk

There are several risks in not having a trained security element.

• With no trained security personnel protecting the representatives, they are susceptible to criminal acts brought against them by the local populace.



- In an emergency situation the representatives will not know what to do, where to go, or how to get to American friendly help.
- The environment and the demeanor of the local populace could change, based on the level of the risk country, which could turn to civil unrest at any moment. With no trained security personnel the team members may not know the situation around them or change in environment.
- In case of an emergency on the ground, or need for evac, there would be no communication back to the parent organization in a timely manner.

Recommendations

- CBC needs to fund a Security Representative from the Security Ministry for every trip to Haiti. This representative needs to be pre-approved by the CBC Director of Security.
- The Security Representative will be responsible for coordinating all security aspects of the team with the host organization, In-Country Director, and others as needed. Their first responsibility is to facilitate a safe and secure trip for all team members, and then second participate fully as a mission team member.
- The host organization(s) need to stop advertising that security is provided for the incoming teams until they can hire trained individuals or train individuals themselves.

Emergency Communications Equipment

Explanation

CBC does not have a church assigned satellite phone or phone with the capability to call in case of an emergency.

Risk

There are a few risks in not having emergency communications equipment.

- With no church assigned communications equipment the team is at the mercy of the host organization or local populace for reach back capability in case of an emergency.
- In an emergency situation the representatives will not have a way to reach local Embassy support.

Recommendation

• CBC needs to acquire assigned communications equipment for each mission trip.


Ground Transportation

Explanation

The host organization provides ground transportation for incoming teams using "tap-taps".

In Country Observations

• Two tap-taps were used for the CBC team, and they got separated daily.



- This made the group more vulnerable by not sticking in large numbers.
- The drivers and/or security individuals would stop in the middle of the town to do personal things instead of taking the team to their site for work.
- No maps were accessible or being used by the local drivers to find their way around the area.

Risk

There are several risks in using "tap-taps" for ground transportation.

- Tap-Taps are equivalent to the American taxi and used by local Haitians as modes of transportation in their area.
- These vehicles are small trucks which have been modified in the bed to seat 8 people with a cover over the individual's heads. The back of the bed is open and not secured. It is often seen that public tap-taps will be crammed with people in every open spot (sitting, standing, and hanging on outside of the vehicle).
- Individuals can jump onto the back of the tap-tap at anytime even if rented by the host organization.
- The lower back and neck of the individuals riding in the tap-tap are exposed to
 the exterior of the vehicle. This is a security risk in that individuals can be
 stabbed, cut, or have anything on their person stolen from behind in a few
 seconds.
- By having an unsecure/open end to the bed of the tap-tap individuals can fall out of the vehicle due to unsafe driving, passing vehicles, road conditions, and speed of the vehicle.
- Individuals in the tap-tap are susceptible to kidnappings, hijacking more easily than traveling in a locked, enclosed vehicle.

Recommendation

- CBC should not send another team down until safe, secured, enclosed vehicles are available to the team for their time in country. Preferably a vehicle large enough to carry the whole team together in the same vehicle.
- FBC should switch their vehicles from tap-taps to enclosed vehicles with operational windows, and locks.
- FBC should also coordinate ahead of time to use a vehicle that will handle the incoming team at the same time.


Route Security

Explanation

The drivers hired by the host organization do not switch the routes each trip, nor coordinate ahead of time their planned routes, or additional routes if a situation arises.

In Country Observations

• Drivers did not pre plan the routes daily.



- Drivers got separated daily by not staying together even when capable due to traffic conditions.
- No maps were used by the local drivers or even accessible to them. Even though on a few occasions we had to stop midway back and had to ask for directions.

Risk

There are several risks in lack of route preparation.

- In Haiti it is a poverty stricken environment and often the clothes and jewelry the Americans carry on their person are highly valuable to the local populace. Due to this Americans and other Foreigners visiting Haiti become targets for criminal behavior.
- Without preparing a route prior to departure the driver(s) are not prepared to react to a situation that is safe for the team members.
- In case of an emergency if the team is broken up or separated the driver(s) do not know what the other is doing and will be placing the team in a more vulnerable situation.

Recommendation

- FBC should train and supervise their drivers in planning for some of the following situations: 2-3 routes to the site, emergency evac routes, civil unrest routes, 2-3 routes to the hospital, 2-3 routes to the housing compound, 2-3 routes to a safe house/complex.
- CBC should make contact with the host organization during the "Planning Stage" to confirm the local drivers are prepared and trained to react safely in a situation with their team.


Housing Security/Operations

Explanation

The host organization provides a housing complex, but it lacks in security operations, and is being used as a public guesthouse as well.

In Country Observations

- There is no access control system in place.
- There is no identification system in place to know who is authorized to be in the compound.
- There is no lock system in place for the house.
- There are no cameras in place as another security layer.
- The gates are secured by pieces of rebar majority of the time.
- On duty guards are not watching for incoming team daily, team is waiting in taptaps for the guard to come to the gate.
- Evening guard crew is not walking the compound and 75% of the compound is not visible to the guard from his post.



- Guards are not trained to watch compounds and not trained in the use of the weapon they are carrying.
- During daylight hours, on a few occasions someone from the general public walked into the compound behind the team. The individual was neither part of the team nor part of the compound staff.
- The housing complex is also being used year round for public housing to people from the airport. The staff on site has no idea who is staying with them. This could be an Extreme Security Risk for any American onsite or teams incoming. Criminal behavior is often pre-planned, and targets are selected due to being "soft", easy and accessible.

Risk

There are several risks in the current housing security and operations.

- When the housing complex is not secure the local populace can overrun, vandalize, and attack individuals from within.
- Visiting teams are vulnerable to theft, attack, kidnapping, and other criminal acts.
- In a situation of civil unrest, based on the location the housing complex could be a temporary safe haven. But, quickly it would become a target due to Americans frequenting the complex, and accessibility to the compound.

Recommendation

- FBC should invest in more training for the individuals watching the complex.
- FBC should develop actual post procedures on how to be a security guard.
- FBC should supervise and monitor the personnel protecting the compound.
- FBC should research providing another gunned position to the opposite side of the current guard tower.
- FBC should research investing into a camera system for the compound.
- FBC should stop the use of the house as a public guest house when the In-Country Director, and/or Americans are in country.
- FBC should have an access control system to the compound to include the actual house as well.
- CBC should make contact during the "Planning Stage" with the host organization to verify the appropriate security precautions and setup have been put into place.


Tactical Medical Bag

Explanation

When traveling in hostile, dangerous, or disaster areas it is imperative to be equipped with medical/emergency equipment.

In Country Observations

• There is no medical support for incoming teams while on ground and onsite.



• There are no medical supplies prepared for each team while in country unless provided by the incoming team.

Risk

There are several risks with having no tactical medical bag in hand for an incoming team.

- If a minor to major medical incident occurs while in country, no support is provided.
- If an incident occurs the individual(s) are left to handle the situation on their own or depend wholly on the locals. Who do not have the interests of the Americans in mind.
- Depending on the incident and/or injury without preparation the individual(s) may suffer or have long term effects due to no medical support.
- Individual(s) and/or teams are susceptible to heat exhaustion, dehydration, cuts, burns, broken limbs, traffic accidents, and criminal attacks based on the current Haiti environment.

Recommendation

- FBC should invest in tactical medical bags for incoming teams.
- FBC should have an established, stocked, and visible medical station/equipment for the residence where incoming teams are staying.
- CBC should double the size of it's current tactical bag for trips to Haiti.
- CBC should invest on as many tactical bags as necessary to account for multiple trips gone at the same time across the world. All trips no matter the threat level should have a tactical medical on the trip in the possession of the CBC Security Representative.

Selection of Team Members

Explanation


When advertising mission opportunities within CBC it is imperative to review the current environment of the location of travel prior. This review needs to be coordinated with the Security Ministry as dictated in church policy. Due to the current worldly environment and the threats against Americans it is imperative to review and plan ahead on whom you open the trip up to. Mission trips are not always to safe zones, tourist areas, nor easy environments with easy duties to be filled. All of these need to be considered and made public when recruiting personnel.

In Country Observations

• Based on the prior mentioned categories within this assessment, a review and prior planning needs to be made about selecting team members.

Risk

There are several risks with the selection of team members for an overseas trip.



- CBC is responsible for anyone allowed to attend the trip. So we should be aware of each individual, and have control over their actions and be able to send them home in an instant if the situation causes such action.
- If the age is not specified a younger, in experienced individual can put other team members at risk based on their actions.
- The environment may not be conducive to females.
- There may not be enough support to handle someone with prior medical conditions.
- The work environment may be too dangerous for non experienced personnel.

Recommendation

- CBC individuals only on a CBC sponsored trip. If CBC is the lead and responsible for all parties, then they need to be CBC individuals only.
- CBC should only allow individuals 21 years of age or older.
- If an individual is 21 or low 20's then CBC should evaluate the individual(s) maturity prior, as this is a dangerous, and extreme environment for Americans.
- CBC should only allow males during the rebuilding/construction phase. While females can absolutely help with rebuilding/construction work, the environment is not safe for American females as stated prior. The security will have to be heightened when an American female is around, and they will become a target more quickly than the American male.
- CBC should only allow individuals who can handle rough construction, extensive heat, little food, and limited water circumstances to be a team member. (Note: this is only during the rebuilding construction phase).

Transition from Rebuilding to Missions Teaching

Explanation

CBC has a unique opportunity to assist in finishing the Haiti Rebuild effort, and then transition into a Missions Teaching opportunity. With this in mind it is imperative to understand that the FBC will be removing themselves from the Haiti location and CBC will be left to partner, lead, or provide oversight. When this occurs CBC needs to start planning now, ahead of time to cover all aspects of the process, as a few pieces have been described in this assessment. This assessment only covers a few aspects of the operations for Haiti, and so it is not recommended to take this as everything that is needed to run the Haiti operation 100%.

In Country Observations

Not applicable.

Risk

There are several risks with the anticipated transition.

- Who will be the lead?
- How will teams arrive?



- Where will teams stay?
- How will teams travel in country?
- Who will select where teams go?
- How will local Haitians be evaluated for incoming team support?
- Who will provide security?
- Who and how will teams be housed?
- Who and how will teams be fed?
- Who and how will teams be supported for medical situations?
- Etc.....

Recommendation

- Prior to any commitments CBC needs to meet and plan for any future trips.
- CBC needs commitments in writing of all said parties who will lead, partner, or go with CBC.
- It is recommended that CBC treat this potential new venture as a new business opportunity and develop a business plan prior to advertising, recruiting, and going on a trip under the new Mission Teaching transition.

Miscellaneous Items

The following items were observed during the security assessment and are being provided as background knowledge of Haiti.

- Stateside Airport
 - DCA security element is strong and active. While awaiting arrival of team members at check in the following was observed scoping out my location and our team (4 suited Federal Air Marshals, 1 uniformed Police Officer, and 2 plain clothed armed personnel).
 - o When checking in, check in 1 person at a time, not as a group. We are not a family so the names, and luggage do not match. It does not make it easier.

Air Travel

- O Continue to split the air travel to Haiti by 2 days due to unforeseen flight delays, weather, etc....
- O not travel wearing the same shirts to destination. As this draws unnecessary attention to the team in the destination location. The criminal element will look for this and start to target this. A well planned trip and established team will be prepared to observe themselves and each other, and stay as a group.
- O Adhere to airline timeframes when traveling, no need to run late or cause undue burden on other team members. (if your early your on time, if your on time your late, if your late we leave you behind).... Think about it for a bit.

Centreville Baptist Church


o Be prepared for customs forms when traveling overseas. Yu must keep one portion with you for duration of trip. If you lose it, it will be come very difficult to get you of country and possibly delay the whole team.

Haiti Airport

- Consists of 1 runway total
- o As you are landing residential housing within 300 ft off runway on left side
- o Limited to no security fencing for access to airport property on runway side
- When de-planing you will enter a terminal and then be led to an escalator down to the main floor, to exit a non secure door, loaded on a transport bus.
- You will see 2 Haitian Police in tan shirts (uniform) carrying small caliber semi automatic pistols. They are observing people, but behind taped off area, there response to an incident will be delayed by maneuvering through, over, or under the barrier.
- o Upon departure you will go thru (local scan, TSA approved scan, and light scan).
- Small ticket area (5 ladies), with customs doing check again (4 lanes). Computer systems with biometrics capability on desk. But all systems turned off and not being used. Dust had accumulated all over the equipment with no visible marks of dusting off the equipment, which would allow us to assume the equipment had not been used for an extended amount of time.
- Upon clearing the 2nd checkpoint there are 3 small little areas to buy items and then you proceed up an escalator to the third scan and flight waiting area.
- o In the flight waiting area it is a large room for everyone with an upstairs loft with a few bar backs and places to order a few drinks/food items.
- o In the waiting area there are approximately 6 mounted cameras (4 dome, 2 older model cube style).

• Haiti Airport Customs

- o From the terminal you will be bussed over ¼ mile to a warehouse for the "Haitian Customs" intake.
- o This is a very rudimentary process, with little to no true security in place.
- There are 4 lanes and everyone is pushed into a line for organization. Here you will present your passport and customs form. There is no computer system in use, and very quick stamp, look method in operation.
- O If you are a local and/or have a connection you can be escorted through in lane 4. At which time your escort can smile, nod, and tap your passport in front of the customs official, who will not review any paperwork, or check you out, and you can proceed through customs, unverified.
- o In the waiting area it was observed that 2 older men in pressed suites walking through the area were the supervisors at some level. The workers did what they stated and these men had full access to anyone and everything.
- Haiti Baggage Claim




- Upon clearing customs you are in the baggage claim area that is a massive open area where bags are literally dropped off.
- There is no privacy or clear lanes of operation. Your baggage can and will be dropped off with others amongst the masses of people. It is very easy to have your belongings stolen, tampered with, or destroyed in this area.
- o There are "red shirts" in the area who are there to help you carry your items out of the airport. You will be rushed and repeatedly approached. Do not use any red shirt, you carry your own items.
- After leaving customs, and getting your bags, you proceed to drop off your customs forms and exit the building. Upon leaving you will be swarmed by local "red shirts". It is imperative to handle your own bags, stay as a group, and everyone move quickly through the mass of people. Your transportation should be ready and waiting for you, to get you out of the area as quickly and safely as possible.
- The parking lot is open to the public, and now you are among the local Haitians.
 Your security and belongings are paramount. Do not take any unplanned transportation method.

Haiti Travel Routes

- Roadway system is a generic paved road with a tremendous amount of damage.
- o Very dangerous with potholes and detours.
- o It is approximately 3-4 cars width on main roads, and small 2 width in city urban areas.
- Travel safety is paramount in that driving laws/regulations do not exist and are not enforced. Individuals drive where there is a whole in traffic. This includes often driving on what we as Americans would classify as "wrong side of the road".
- o Travel from guest house to embassy will be anywhere from 30 minutes to 2+ hours

Guesthouse

- Guesthouse is located just outside of port au prince center, and is on the upper part of a road way.
- The description is described prior in the assessment
- o The current host is connected to the Warden System
- Neighborhood is residential, with a Voo-doo temple or meeting location next door.
- There have been additions to this house, but it is also imperative to know that the house is also used as a "public guesthouse". Meaning locals if connected to workers or someone can get a room for the night. This guest house is not secured at a satisfactory level.




- There are separate rooms if scheduled ahead for females and males. But the best setup is a large bunk room. It is imperative to plan ahead to see if they can accommodate male and female on the same trip.
- No running hot water, conserve water, and it can be nice and cold.

• Haitian Police

- o In nice pressed tan uniforms
- Carrying .357 smith and wesson revolvers, small caliber semi automatic pistols, shotguns, AR-15 style assault rifles, and specialized unit carrying semi automatic Glocks.
- Work as teams, 3 or more 99% of the time. Not doing much work, just leaning on vehicles or cutting up. Not much interaction as far as police duties are concerned.
- Observed doing random vehicle checks, carrying shotguns with one hand and waving them around. Not professional about carrying of weapons or how they are directed at individuals.
- They were seen in Nissan Patrols, Trucks, large military transport, ATV's,a nd motorcycles.
- Specialized unit for crowd control is BIM. They travel by ATV and/or motorcycles, carrying more of the high powered weapons, and wearing ski masks to hide their identity.
- Most police personnel had no restraining equipment (i.e.: handcuffs, flex cuffs, etc...).
- O They seem to rule by intimidation, forceful gestures, and loud yelling are the first actions. If that does not occur the authorities will get in the way, face to face, then brandish weapons. This applies to minor incidents, not just severe incidents.
- o They can be paid off and current process, especially important during civil unrest or evacuation out of country.

• General Atmospherics

- This is a third world environment with the an extreme level of poverty in every area. This area resembles Baghdad, rural/dark Mexico City, and run down slums. The infrastructure does not exist.
- When traveling with a group, stay as a group, do not wander off alone. Work with a buddy, and let the Security Rep know as they are responsible for the WHOLE group.
- O When in town, on site, or visiting mass graves it is common to se general public carrying machetes. No threat was made or feel of threat with machetes. But due to possible civil unrest every adult will have a machete within their reach.
- o It is recommended only local help drive as Americans are guilty no matter the circumstances if an accident occurs. For any accident or injury a crowd forms instantly, and it can become an extreme risk environment within minutes.



- o In country personnel admitted to driving themselves even after being directed not to do so. Their level of security awareness is not inline with the current environment. They are putting themselves and others at risk.
- There is an indoor shopping market accessible as a team for any small items and groceries that you may need. It is recommended to only use local currency as they have a hard time with US Dollars and the exchange.
- When Americans are in the area the local populace is very watchful of each individual, and their actions.
- This is not a trip for sight seeing. If it is requested to sight see, then it is to be planned ahead of time with the Security Rep.
- DO NOT hand out items even candy. You will get rushed, and it will cause panic, potentially leading to unrest. This will put yourself and the team in danger immediately.
- DO NOT travel to Haiti during the following dates: End of October thru Nov. 3rd, and February around Mardi Gras timeframe.


Summary

In summary the environment in Haiti is in need of continued support by established organizations from America. The churches and religious organizations will in the foreseeable future continue to be welcomed and be able to provide support throughout the country. With this in mind the mission field is rich with opportunity to serve, spread the word of God, and Glorify God through faithful service. Each organization must be prepared and understand as mentioned throughout this document that prior planning, preparation, security, and prayer are essential for a successful operation. To understand that the field is rich with opportunity everyone must prepare themselves and their teams ahead of time as severe incidents can occur at any moment. If this does happen then teams who are un prepared could suffer severe consequences and local churches to include organizations could be held accountable for their decisions. As you read and brief this assessment it is imperative to understand that security is everyone's responsibility.

Action Plan

The following section of this assessment relates to the action plan for each organization and leader. The recommendations and action plan are steps to help guide you in the right direction for a safe and successful operation while in Haiti. Each organization must plan, and research accordingly as they are responsible for their own actions. The generic action plan is as follows:

- Review Security Assessment with stateside organizational leaders.
- After review, focus on recommendations under each category.
- Send assessment as approved to in country representatives, or those who will become in country representatives.
- Proceed with implementing recommendations as mentioned prior.
- Firm up new processes with the newly established recommendations.



- Review new processes for any holes, threats, vulnerabilities.
- Research through network of professionals on next steps to continue to improve successful operation.
- Conduct security assessment for each trip.
- Conduct lessons learned after each trip.
- Make changes and improvements based on all of the above.
- Repeat the whole cycle continuously, safety and security are always evolving. The threat
 and criminal element are always changing as well, so you must be aware, prepared, and
 knowledgeable.